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I. THE ACCIDENT
Lloyd Hull knew he had a serious drinking problem. Ever since
his retirement from the Navy two years before, it seemed as though he
needed to get a little high, or better, every day. After getting off work
on September 21, 1977, in Berryville, Arkansas, Lloyd was on his way
to visit his older sister in Okarche, Oklahoma. Next to the bottle of
Jim Beam on the front seat was a loaded .22 Magnum pistol for shoot-
ing jack rabbits on his sister's farm. Lloyd was driving a 1971 Ford
Torino he had bought just the week before, paying $500 down. It had a
large V-8 engine, good tires and brakes, and was in perfect working
condition.1
As he drove along, Lloyd took shots from the bottle of bourbon.
After passing through Tulsa around nightfall, he relaxed as he got on
the Turner Turnpike that runs to Oklahoma City. He was not in any
particular hurry to get to his sister's place, and he was not paying at-
tention to his speed. Later he assumed he must have been driving too
fast on account of the liquor. Lloyd did not notice the small car ahead
of him until he was nearly on top of it. By the time he managed to hit
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. I wish to thank Den-
nis Bires, Larry Dessem, Kevin Clermont, Allen Kamp, and Linda Lacey for
their encouragement and helpful comments on a previous draft of this article. I
am also grateful to Mike Barkley, Claire Eagan, Jefferson Greer, Bert Jones, and
Leonard Pataki for talking to me about their involvement in the World-Wide
Volkswagen case.
1. Deposition of Lloyd Hull, Robinson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., No. 78-C-7-B,
transcript at 5-35 (N.D. Okla., taken Feb. 21, 1978).
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his brakes, it was too late to avoid the car. His Torino slammed into
the other car, a little off center on the driver's side. Lloyd saw the
small car continue down the road for a few seconds after the collision,
come to a stop, and then catch on fire. Lloyd pulled over and watched
the small car burn, but he did not get out of his Torino. He noticed
that the needle on his speedometer was jammed at seventy-five miles
per hour.2
Harry Robinson suffered from arthritis. During the long winters
in Massena, New York, a small town on the St. Lawrence Seaway next
to Canada, his ankles and knees would swell up and bleed so badly
that he had to stay in bed for two or three months at a time. His doc-
tor had told him he needed a dry, warmer climate, and so he and his
wife, Kay, had sold their restaurant and were moving to Tucson, Ari-
zona with their three children. Kay was driving the 1976 Audi 100 LS
that she and Harry had purchased new the year before from Seaway
Volkswagen in Massena. Their daughter, Eva, age thirteen, and oldest
son, Sam, sixteen, rode with her. Harry had rented a U-Haul truck for
the furniture, and he and their other son, Sidney, age fifteen, were
riding in the truck about fifty yards ahead of the Audi.s
Sam was in the front seat of the Audi, and he was the first to see
the approaching headlights through the rear window. Sam yelled to
his mother that the car behind was going to hit them, and as Kay
looked in her rearview mirror, the Torino crashed into the back of the
Audi.4
Sam saw the fire start in the area over the rear seat right after they
were hit. Kay took her foot off the gas pedal and pulled the car off to
the side of the road and put it in park. The fire covered the area above
the rear seat and was spewing out gray sooty smoke. The blaze spread
quickly over the rear seat, and the inside of the car got hot rapidly.
Sam and Kay both tried to open their front doors but could not open
either of them even though the doors were not locked. Somehow they
had been jammed shut by the collision. Sam and Kay tried the rear
doors, but they were jammed, too. Eva jumped from the back into the
front seat. By that time flames were shooting out of the space where
the seat back and the bottom cushion met in the rear seat. All the
windows were rolled up, except for the side vent on Kay's side, and
none of them would open either. Kay, Eva, and Sam were trapped.5
By the time they tried to open all the doors and windows, the fire
2. Id.
3. Deposition of Harry Robinson, Robinson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., No. C-77-
100, transcript at 18-20, 40, 48-49 (Creek County Dist. Ct., Okla., taken Dec. 30,
1977).
4. Deposition of Kay Robinson, Robinson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., No. C-77-100,
transcript at 14-15 (Creek County Dist. Ct., Okla.).
5. Id at 16-20.
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had spread to the front of the car. Kay lay down on the front seat and
tried to kick out the side window, but could not. The car was full of
smoke and she could not see anything. Sam tried desperately to break
the window with his fist. Kay heard people moving outside the car,
but she could not see them. She heard Eva's hair catch on fire; it
sounded like a torch.6
Harry Robinson noticed the Audi's headlights moving back and
forth in the side mirrors of the U-Haul truck. His son, Sidney, looked
out the right mirror and saw the flames ignite. He said "That's
Mama's car," and Harry pulled over and got out of the cab. The Audi
was moving toward them sliding sideways, and fire and smoke were
coming out of the trunk. The Audi came to a stop and rolled back-
wards onto the grass by the side of the road. Due to his arthritis,
Harry was only able to hobble toward the car and Sidney reached it
first. Harry tried to open the doors on the driver's side, and then
moved around the car to try the doors on the other side. When he
reached the passenger side, the rear window blew out, and the fire
seemed to erupt at the back of the car. Harry could see his family
struggling inside. Sam appeared to be banging his head against the
window, trying to break out. Meanwhile, Sidney was pounding on the
outside of the windshield with his fist. Just when it seemed that Kay,
Eva, and Sam would never get out of the car alive, a hero came to their
rescue.7
Mike Miller first noticed the Ford Torino when he passed it on the
right. As he looked over at the driver, Mike could tell he was drunk.
At a curve further down the highway, the Torino nearly came to a
stop and nearly went off the road, but it got back on the highway,
practically running over some barrels beside the road. Then it picked
up speed and passed Mike. A short time later Mike saw a ball of fire.
He immediately stopped and ran over to the burning Audi, leaving his
car door open and the engine running.8 As he ran, he thought perhaps
he should have driven back to the tollgate at the entrance to the Tur-
ner Turnpike to report the accident instead of trying to help the peo-
ple in the burning car himself.9
By the time Mike reached the Audi, the passenger compartment
was engulfed in flames and filled with smoke. All he could see inside
were two dark figures moving around, but he could hear people in the
car screaming and banging on the windows. Sidney was not doing any
good beating on the windshield with his fist, so Mike pushed him aside
and kicked at the windshield. As it started to cave in, he gave it an-
6. Id.
7. Deposition of Harry Robinson, supra note 3, at 49-56.
8. Deposition of MAike Miller, Robinson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., No. 80-C-85-E,
transcript at 5-12 (N.D. Okla. taken Oct. 28, 1981).
9. Jerry Fink, Sapulpan Saves 3 in Burning Car, TULSA WORLD, Sep. 23, 1977, at 1.
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other push and knocked a big hole through the windshield on the pas-
senger side.10
The fire was so intense by now that it looked as if there were a
flame thrower in the back of the car with the blaze swirling around
and concentrated on the driver's side. As flames curled around the
hole that Mike had made in the windshield, two arms appeared. Mike
reached down to grab Sam's arms above the elbows, but Mike's hands
slipped off the burning flesh. He grabbed Sam again, this time by the
wrists, and pulled his head and shoulders through the hole. While
Mike dragged Sam off the hood of the car, another man on the scene,
Etsel Warner, pulled Eva through the hole.11
The fire continued to burn furiously, and Mike could not see any-
one else through the thick black smoke in the car. Then. he heard
Harry yell, "Get my wife out of there." Mike looked through the hole
and a hand suddenly appeared reaching through the smoke and
flames. Kay had felt Sam and Eva go out of the car, and when nobody
reached in for her, she figured that she must be on the wrong side.
She moved over to the other side of the car and stuck her hand out.
Mike grabbed her wrist and pulled as hard as he could. Luckily, Kay
weighed only 98 pounds, and she practically flew through the hole and
out of the inferno.12
Mike helped the three victims move away from the burning car.
After taking only a couple of steps, Mike heard a small explosion from
inside the car. Mike did not look back, but kept walking, only faster,
and he got the three victims to lie down. Kay and Eva had been wear-
ing polyester blouses, which had melted and were stuck to their
bodies.13
The highway patrol arrived on the scene, then the fire department,
and finally an ambulance. Highway Patrol Trooper Spencer walked to
the Ford Torino to question Lloyd Hull, who had a two inch gash on
his lower lip, but was otherwise unhurt. Since Mr. Hull was obviously
drunk, Trooper Spencer arrested him and took him to the hospital to
have his lip sewn up, and then to jail, where he remained for fourteen
days.14
Kay, Sam, and Eva Robinson all received severe burns. Sam suf-
fered first and second degree burns on his face, neck, upper back, and
arms. A nostril was burned, and he had a deep scar on his right cheek,
10. Deposition of Mike Miller, supra note 8, at 12-15.
11. id- at 15-19.
12. Id at 20-24.
13. Id at 23, 26-28.
14. Deposition of Lloyd Hull, supra note 1 at 13-14. When Trooper Spencer arrived
on the scene, Mr. Hull, who had been examining the front of his car, turned to
him and said: "Well, I sure fucked up my car." Trooper Spencer felt like shooting
him on the spot. Interview with Bert M. Jones, Attorney (Oct. 8, 1992).
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and keloid scars on his chin, arms, and hands. Because she had been
in the burning car longer, Eva's injuries were more serious. She suf-
fered third degree burns on her neck, shoulders, and arms. Her vocal
chords were burned, and she required skin grafts on her back, shoul-
ders, and right hand. Fortunately, though, Eva had covered her face,
and it had not been burned as badly as it otherwise might have been.
Both Sam and Eva were hospitalized for six weeks in Tulsa, and spent
many months undergoing physical therapy and reconstructive
surgery.1 5
Since Kay Robinson had been trapped in the burning car the long-
est, her burns were the most horrible of all. She had burns on forty-
eight percent of her body-thirty-five percent of which were third de-
gree. Kay was in the intensive care unit for seventy-seven days and
was hospitalized in Tulsa for another several months. She underwent
thirty-four operations, all but two of which were under general anes-
thetic, for skin grafts and other reconstructive surgery. Most of her
fingers were amputated, and she had severe scarring over the entire
upper part of her body. Eva and Kay also suffered severe psychologi-
cal trauma both from the ordeal and from their permanent
disfigurement.16
With his wife and children hospitalized, Harry Robinson began the
process of seeking redress for their injuries. The effort was to con-
tinue for more than fifteen years in state and federal trial courts in
Oklahoma, a federal trial court in Arizona, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and
the United States Supreme Court. Along the way the litigation would
produce a landmark Supreme Court decision in the area of personal
jurisdiction, World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson.17
II. FILING THE LAWSUIT
Harry Robinson first retained a Tulsa attorney named Charles
Whitebook who brought in the Tulsa law firm of Greer and Greer,
headed by two brothers who had specialized in personal injury litiga-
tion for many years. Jefferson Greer was the lead attorney, but his
younger brother Frank devoted a significant amount of his time to the
case as well. Mr. Greer was a prominent member of the personal in-
jury plaintiffs' bar, having served as President of the Oklahoma Trial
Lawyers Association in 1966 and as a Governor of The Association of
Trial Lawyers of America in 1977. He had more than twenty years of
experience trying personal injury cases and had handled some of the
15. Opening Statements, Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, No.
80-C-85-E, transcript at 9-12 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 23, 1981).
16. Id.
17. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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earliest products liability cases in Oklahoma.' 8
Lloyd Hull was an obvious defendant, but he had no liability insur-
ance, and consequently any judgment the Robinsons could obtain
against him would be uncollectible. To obtain an enforceable judg-
ment, the Robinsons would have to sue the manufacturer of the Audi
on a products liability claim. To prevail, they would need to establish
that the Audi was defective and that its defects had caused their
injuries.
At the time of the Robinsons' accident, the law of products liability
was undergoing fundamental change in Oklahoma. Prior to 1974, a
manufacturer's liability under Oklahoma law for injuries caused by a
defective product could be based upon one of only two theories: negli-
gence, or breach of express or implied warranties of the manufac-
turer.' 9 In 1974, the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted a rule of strict
liability for manufacturers for defects in their products in Kirkland v.
General Motors Corporation,2O relying on section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. Thus, if the Robinsons could establish that
the Audi was defective, its manufacturer would be strictly liable for
their injuries, regardless of negligence.2 '
The dollar amounts of jury verdicts in personal injury cases had
been increasing dramatically during the 1970s.2 2 In February 1978, a
California jury returned a verdict for $128.5 million in Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Company.23 There were a number of similarities between
the Grimshaw case and the Robinson's case against the manufacturer
of the Audi. In Grimshaw, the gas tank of a 1972 Ford Pinto exploded
when the Pinto was "rear-ended" while stalled on a freeway. The
driver died as a result of the fire, and Richard Grimshaw, a thirteen
year old passenger, suffered severe burns on his face and entire
body.24
It was evident that there was the potential for the Robinsons to
18. VI Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory 231B (1987).
19. See Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1358-62 (Okla. 1974)(tracing
development of products liability in Oklahoma).
20. 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
21. In 1976, a $150,000 verdict against Volkswagen of America (the importer of the
Audi) was affirmed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court on a products liability claim
involving a design defect in the Volkswagen ignition locking system. See Fields v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 63 (Okla. 1976).
22. See Larry Bodine, Million-Dollar Jury Awards, NAT'L L.J., Jun. 18, 1979, at 1
(survey showed an increase in the number of million dollar verdicts nationwide
from fewer than 20 in 1973 to more than 50 in 1977).
23. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 389-392 (1981)(affirming trial court's reduction of $125 million
punitive damages award to $3.5 million). The jury verdict awarded $2,516,000
compensatory damages and $125 million punitive damages to the severely burned
passenger, Richard Grimshaw, and $559,680 compensatory damages to the heirs of
the driver, Lilly Gray. Id. at 358.
24. Id.
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recover a substantial, perhaps multi-million dollar verdict. The extent
of their injuries, the pain and suffering, and the psychological trauma
would surely win a jury's sympathy. On the other hand, the
Oklahoma law of products liability was in its early stages of develop-
ment, and there were a number of unsettled legal issues. The trial
would be complicated by the need for testimony by experts in automo-
tive engineering and safety, as well as the usual medical experts and
experts on damages. Moreover, the German auto manufacturers had
earned a reputation for being particularly aggressive defendants.
While Mr. Greer realized at the outset that the case would be difficult
to try, he could not have anticipated the extent of the obstacles he
would encounter.
An aspect of the Robinsons' case that Mr. Greer immediately rec-
ognized as significant was the fact that the accident had occurred just a
few miles outside of Tulsa County in Creek County,25 Oklahoma,
making venue proper in Creek County.26 An oil boom had come to
Creek County at the turn of the century, but had ended shortly after
World War I, and it had been an especially depressed area during the
1930'S.27 By the 1970's, Creek County was a blue collar community
that had become known to personal injury lawyers throughout the
state as being particularly sympathetic to personal injury plaintiffs.
The attractiveness of Creek County as a plaintiffs' venue was and is
demonstrated by the numerous change of venue cases that have
originated there. 28 Mr. Greer regarded Creek County as one of the
best venues in which to try a personal injury lawsuit in the United
States.29 He rated it on a par with Dade County, Florida, or Cook
County, Illinois,30 both notoriously high-verdict jurisdictions, and he
estimated that a case in Creek County was worth twice as much as it
would be in Tulsa County.
Mr. Greer knew he needed to be prepared for the defendants' at-
tempt to defeat venue in Creek County through removal of the case to
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma in Tulsa, a standard defense strategy in cases involving
25. Creek County is adjacent to Tulsa County.
26. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 141 (1991)(providing for venue in automobile accident
cases "[i]n any county where the damages or a part thereof were sustained"). The
cars had just left Tulsa County when the accident occurred.
27. OKLAHoMA DEP'T OF LIBRARIES, DIRECTORY OF OKLAHOMA 418 (84th ed. 1991).
28. See, e.g., Thornton v. Woodson, 570 P.2d 340 (Okla. 1977); Harwood v. Woodson,
565 P.2d I (Okla. 1977); Halliburton Co. v. District Ct. of Creek County, 525 P.2d
628 (Okla. 1974); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. District Ct. of Creek County, 512
P.2d 170 (Okla. 1973); Gulf Oil Co. v. Woodson, 505 P.2d 484 (Okla. 1972).
29. Jefferson G. Greer, Lecture, The University of Tulsa College of Law (Oct. 17,
1989)(Videotape on file with the University of Nebraska College of Law Library).
30. Letter from Jefferson G. Greer, Attorney, to Russell J. Weintraub, Professor in
Civil Jurisprudence, The University of Texas at Austin School of Law 1 (Nov. 9,
1983)(on file with the University of Nebraska College of Law Library).
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nonresident defendants. Since the Robinsons had been citizens of
New York, he would have to name defendants who were also citizens
of New York to destroy diversity of citizenship and thereby block re-
moval. After verifying that Seaway Volkswagen, Inc., the car dealer
from whom the Robinsons had purchased the Audi, was incorporated
in and had its principal place of business in New York, Mr. Greer
named Seaway Volkswagen as one of the defendants in the case. He
also named World-Wide Volkswagen, Inc., the distributor which sup-
plied the Audi to Seaway Volkswagen, as another defendant. World-
Wide Volkswagen was also a citizen of New York, since it was incorpo-
rated there. The other defendant originally named in the case was
Volkswagen of America, Inc., which had imported the Audi from Ger-
many and was a citizen of New Jersey.3 1
Mr. Greer filed separate petitions on behalf of each of the Robin-
sons in the Bristow Division of the District Court of Creek County on
October 18, 1977. The Presiding Judge was Charles S. Woodson. Each
of the petitions alleged a single cause of action for products liability
based on defects in the design and location of the Audi's gas tank.32
On May 23, 1978, Mr. Greer filed amended petitions in which he
added Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft (Volkswagen of Germany)
as a defendant. At the time Mr. Greer understood that Volkswagen of
Germany had manufactured the Audi. He later was informed through
a conversation with defense counsel and in responses to his interroga-
tories that the manufacturer of the Audi was Audi NSU Auto Union
Aktiengesellschaft (Audi NSU). Accordingly, on June 14, 1978, he ob-
tained an order substituting Audi NSU for Volkswagen of Germany as
the defendant manufacturer. The correct identity of the Audi's manu-
facturer would later become a crucial issue in the case.33
Volkswagen of Germany, Volkswagen of America, and Audi NSU
were affiliated companies, and all were represented in the United
States by the prestigious Wall Street law firm of Herzfeld and
Rubin.34 Rhodes, Hieronymus, Holloway and Wilson, a Tulsa law firm
specializing in insurance defense, was retained as local counsel. Bert
Jones, a senior partner at Rhodes, Hieronymous, took charge of the
case in Tulsa. Separate counsel were needed for the other defendants,
World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen, and Mr. Jones recommended
Tulsa lawyers, Mike Barkley and Dan Rogers, respectively, to repre-
31. Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ of Prohibition,
Appendix, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 29-32, World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)(No. 78-1078).
32. Id- at 29-30, 32.
33. See infra notes 167-180 and accompanying text.
34. See Allen R. Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme Court's New Juris-





Mike Barkley was twenty-nine years old at the time, and he had
recently set up his own office. Before that, he had been an associate
for several years at Rogers, Rogers and Jones, an insurance defense
firm in which Dan Rogers was a named partner. Having been on his
own for only a short while, Mike was thrilled to get the call from Mr.
Jones concerning the case, and he was eager to defend his new client,
World-Wide Volkswagen.3 6
Volkswagen of America, World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen
each filed special appearances to contest jurisdiction in Oklahoma and
venue in Creek County, and after a hearing on December 21, 1977,
Judge Woodson overruled their special appearances. 37 Harry Robin-
son's deposition was taken on December 30, and the defendants
learned that prior to the accident he and Kay Robinson had sold their
home and business in New York and had already purchased a new
home in Arizona.38 On January 5, 1978, the defendants joined in a
petition for removal to the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Oklahoma, claiming that the Robinsons were no longer
citizens of New York, and consequently, federal subject matter juris-
diction existed based on diversity of citizenship.3 9
Mr. Greer responded with a motion to remand in which he con-
tended that although the Robinsons were in the process of changing
their citizenship, they did not become citizens of Arizona until arriv-
ing there after their release from the hospital in Tulsa.40 He argued
that when their petition was filed in Creek County,41 the Robinsons
were still citizens of New York,42 like World-Wide Volkswagen and
Seaway, and thus there could be no federal subject matter jurisdiction
based on diversity of citizenship.
Claire Eagan had been the law clerk for Allen E. Barrow, the chief
federal judge in the Northern District of Oklahoma, since graduating
35. Interview with Mike Barkley, Attorney (Apr. 10, 1991).
36. Id.
37. Order Overruling Motions to Quash and Plea to the Jurisdiction, Appendix, Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari at 13-14, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980)(No. 78-1078).
38. Petition for Removal, Robinson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., No. 78-C-7-B
(N.D. Okla. filed Jan. 5, 1978).
39. Brief of Respondent at 3, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)(No. 78-1078).
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 16 (1969)("To acquire a
domicil of choice in a place, a person must be physically present there").
41. Cf. Mann v. City of Tucson, Dep't of Police, 782 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.
1986)("Existence of diversity jurisdiction is determined by the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the filing of the complaint, not at the time the cause of
action arose or after the action is commenced.").
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19 (1969)("A domicil once estab-
lished continues until it is superseded by a new domicil.").
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in 1976 from Fordham University School of Law. One of her last as-
signments for Judge Barrow before entering private practice in 1978
was the Robinsons' motion to remand to Creek County. Ms. Eagan's
research supported Mr. Greer's position, and she drafted Judge Bar-
row's order remanding the case to Creek County.
43
Ms. Eagan left her employment with Judge Barrow at the end of
April, 1978, and on the following Monday began work at Hall, Estill,
Hardwick, Gable, Collingsworth and Nelson, the largest law firm in
Tulsa. By coincidence, Mike Barkley joined the Hall, Estill firm on
the same day. On the first day in their new jobs, Mr. Barkley ap-
peared in Ms. Eagan's office, dropped the World-Wide Volkswagen file
on her desk, and told her that she was now assigned to assist him with
getting World-Wide Volkswagen out of the state court action.44
III. THE BATTLE OVER JURISDICTION
Since removal had not been successful, World-Wide Volkswagen's
only way to avoid trial in Creek County was by establishing that
Oklahoma lacked personal jurisdiction over the company. On Janu-
ary 5, 1978, the same day the defendants had filed the petition for re-
moval, World-Wide Volkswagen and Seaway Volkswagen had filed
separate motions for Judge Woodson to reconsider his order overrul-
ing their special appearances. 4 5 No action had been taken on the mo-
tions to reconsider while the case was in federal court, but once it was
43. Order, Robinson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., No. 78-C-7-B (N.D. Okla., filed Mar.
14, 1978).
44. Claire V. Eagan, Lecture, The University of Tulsa College of Law (Oct. 17,
1989)(videotape on file with the University of Nebraska College of Law Library).
Ms. Eagan's representation of World-Wide Volkswagen was not prohibited under
DR 9-101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which was in effect in
Oklahoma at the time. By the time Mr. Barkley requested her to work on the
case, the matter had been remanded to state court, and the case did not return to
federal court until after World-Wide Volkswagen had been dismissed from the
case. Moreover, as Judge Barrow's law clerk, she neither acted upon the merits
of the case nor had substantial responsibility for it. See MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL REsPONsIBILITY DR 9-101(A)(1980) (prohibiting a lawyer from accepting
private employment "in a matter upon the merits of which he has acted in a judi-
cial capacity"); DR 9-101(B)(prohibiting a lawyer from accepting private employ-
ment "in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a
public employee"). The provisions of Rule 1.12 of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility, which are now in effect in most jurisdictions, are somewhat
broader and may have prohibited Ms. Eagan from working on the World-Wide
Volkswagen case if they had been in effect at the time. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.12 (1983)(prohibiting a lawyer from representing
"anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally
and substantially as a judge or... law clerk ... , unless all parties to the proceed-
ing consent after consultation").
45. Motion to Reconsider, Robinson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., No. C-77-100
(Creek County District Ct., Okla., filed Jan. 5, 1978).
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remanded to Creek County, Mike Barkley had the motions set for re-
hearing and sent Claire Eagan to handle the argument. It was the first
motion she had ever argued.46
In 1978, Oklahoma had two long-arm jurisdiction statutes that per-
Initted its courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants,
sections 187 and 1701.03 of title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes.47 Section
187 had been adopted in 1963 and was based on the Illinois long arm
statute.48 Although section 187 authorized the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents with respect to causes of action arising
from a variety of acts, none of these applied to World-Wide Volk-
swagen.49 Section 1701.03 had been adopted in 1965 as a part of the
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act. It was some-
what broader than section 187 and authorized the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant as to causes of action arising
from either of the following:
(3) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state
if [the nonresident] regularly does or solicits business or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used
or consumed or services rendered, in this state.
5 0
The Robinsons' injuries had occurred in Oklahoma, but the acts or
omissions of World-Wide Volkswagen that were alleged to have
caused the injuries would appear to have been in New York, rather
than Oklahoma. Moreover, World-Wide Volkswagen's distribution
franchise was limited to Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, and
it neither conducted business in Oklahoma nor derived any revenue
from the state. Thus, there seemed to be a strong basis for arguing
that World-Wide Volkswagen was not subject to personal jurisdiction
under Oklahoma's long-arm statutes. On the other hand, only two
years before, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had held that section
1701.03 authorized the assertion of jurisdiction over Volkswagen of
America and a Volkswagen distributor in Texas in another products
liability case.5 1
46. Claire V. Eagan, supra note 44.
47. Both long-arm statutes were repealed in 1984, when they were replaced by OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(F)(1991), which provides: "A court of this state may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the
Constitution of the United States."
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 17 (1959)(recodified at para. 2-209).
49. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 187 (1981)(repealed 1984). One of its provisions ex-
tended jurisdiction to causes of action arising from "the manufacture or distribu-
tion of a product which is sold in the regular course of business within this state
and is used within this state." It was not applicable, however, because World-
Wide Volkswagen's business was limited to the tri-state area of Connecticut, New
York, and New Jersey, and it did not distribute any Audis in Oklahoma. See
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 289 (1980).
50. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1701.03 (1981)(repealed 1984).
51. Fields v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 53 (Okla. 1976).
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Ms. Eagan argued to Judge Woodson that Oklahoma did not have
personal jurisdiction over her client under section 1701.03, because
World-Wide Volkswagen did not sell any automobiles in Oklahoma.
In addition, she maintained that construing section 1701.03 to extend
personal jurisdiction over World-Wide Volkswagen would violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Judge Woodson advised the inexperienced law-
yer that the Fourteenth Amendment did not carry much weight in
Creek County, and the motion to reconsider was denied.52
Ms. Eagan was ready to abandon her effort, but Mike Barkley was
convinced that Creek County had no jurisdiction over his client. He
told her to prepare an application to assume original jurisdiction and a
petition for a writ of prohibition and file it with the Oklahoma
Supreme Court. Although Volkswagen of America and Audi NSU
had also objected to jurisdiction at the trial court level, they did not
join in World-Wide Volkswagen's petition to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. However, Seaway Volkswagen, the auto dealer, did join in the
petition. Seaway Volkswagen's liability was based on its having sold a
defective product that World-Wide Volkswagen had supplied, and
therefore, it was entitled to indemnity from World-Wide Volk-
swagen.53 Moreover, as long as Seaway Volkswagen did not take a
position that was adverse to World-Wide Volkswagen, it would be enti-
tled to indemnification for its attorney's fees. 54 Consequently, World-
Wide Volkswagen assumed primary responsibility for defending the
case against Seaway Volkswagen and itself, and Seaway Volkswagen
took a passive role throughout the litigation, joining in all of World-
Wide Volkswagen's actions.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted the application to assume
original jurisdiction, but it denied the writ of prohibition.55 Mr. Greer
maintained before the Oklahoma Supreme Court that jurisdiction ex-
isted under both paragraphs (3) and (4) of section 1701.03, citing the
Illinois Supreme Court's holding in Gray v. American Radiator &
52. Letter from Claire V. Eagan, Attorney, to Charles W. Adams, Professor of Law,
The University of Tulsa College of Law, (Oct. 19, 1992) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Nebraska College of Law Library).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B cmt. d (1977)("The supplier of a
defective chattel is required to indemnify a retailer regardless of whether his tort
liability is based on negligence or on strict liability, so long as the retailer has
failed to discover the defect before selling the product."); W. PAGE KEETON Er
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 51 at 342 (5th ed. 1984).
54. See Booker v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 785 P.2d 297, 299 (Okla.
1989)("[I]ndemnification of legal costs is not permissible where an adverse posi-
tion has been taken by the claimant against the party from whom indemnity is
sought.").
55. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 352 (Okla. 1979), rev'd,
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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Standard Sanitary Corporation.56 The Gray case involved an inter-
pretation of the provision in the Illinois long-arm statute that author-
ized the assertion of jurisdiction arising from the "commission of a
single tort within this State."57 Reasoning that a tort was not com-
plete until a plaintiff sustained an injury, the Illinois Supreme Court
decided that a defendant that had manufactured and sold a defective
product in another state committed a tort in Illinois and was therefore
subject to jurisdiction there, because the plaintiff's injury resulting
from the defect was sustained in Illinois.58
The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that a similar interpretation
of paragraph (3) would render paragraph (4) nugatory, because it
would make it impossible to have a tortious injury in the state caused
by an act or omission outside the state.5 9 Nevertheless, it held that
paragraph (4) conferred jurisdiction over World-Wide Volkswagen,
because given the retail value of the Audi, World-Wide Volkswagen
had derived substantial revenue from the Robinsons' use of the Audi
in Oklahoma as well as from the sale of other automobiles that from
time to time would foreseeably be used in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court explained its holding as follows:
[Tihe product being sold and distributed by [World-Wide and Seaway Volk-
swagen] is by its very design and purpose so mobile that [World-Wide and Sea-
way Volkswagen] can foresee its possible use in Oklahoma. This is especially
true of the distributor, who has the exclusive right to distribute such automo-
bile in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. The evidence presented be-
low demonstrated that goods sold and distributed by [World-Wide and Seaway
Volkswagen] were used in the State of Oklahoma, and under the facts we be-
lieve it reasonable to infer, given the retail value of the automobile, that
[World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen] derive substantial income from
automobiles which from time to time are used in the State of Oklahoma. This
being the case, we hold that under the facts presented, the trial court was
justified in concluding that [World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen] derive sub-
stantial revenue from goods used or consumed in this State.
6 0
As soon as the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision came down,
Mr. Barkley told Ms. Eagan to pack her bags because they were going
to New York.61 Mr. Barkley was still not ready to give up, and he
wanted to obtain authorization from his client to petition the United
States Supreme Court for certiorari. When Mr. Barkley and Ms.
56. 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 17 (1959)(recodified at para. 2-209).
58. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E. 2d 761, 762-63
(Ill. 1961).
59. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla. 1979), rev'd,
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
60. Id.
61. Mike Barkley had never been to New York before. Claire Eagan had grown up in
New York, and so, part of the reason he wanted her along was so that she could




Eagan met with World-Wide Volkswagen's corporate counsel and its
insurer in New York, both refused to authorize them to incur any ad-
ditional legal expenses contesting the jurisdictional issue. Their justi-
fication was that World-Wide Volkswagen was entitled to
indemnification against Volkswagen of America and Audi NSU for
the same reason that Seaway Volkswagen was entitled to be indemni-
fied by World-Wide Volkswagen.62 Since World-Wide Volkswagen
was not willing to pay to take the case to the United States Supreme
Court, Ms. Eagan thought the battle over jurisdiction was finally at an
end.
But Mr. Barkley took Ms. Eagan across the street to the offices of
Herzfeld and Rubin, the law firm representing Volkswagen of
America and Audi NSU. Mr. Barkley explained to the lawyers at
Herzfeld and Rubin that if World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen were
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, Volkswagen of America
and Audi NSU could remove the case to federal court and avoid a trial
before a "plaintiff's jury" in Creek County. He managed to convince
them that it was in their clients' interests to underwrite the legal ex-
penses of taking the case to the United States Supreme Court, particu-
larly since their clients were already obligated to indemnify World-
Wide and Seaway Volkswagen's legal expenses. As a result of Mike
Barkley's meeting with Herzfeld and Rubin, Volkswagen of America
and Audi NSU agreed to pay for World-Wide Volkswagen's petition
for certiorari.63 In addition, Herzfeld and Rubin would participate in
the preparation of the briefs, and a senior partner of Herzfeld and
Rubin, Herbert Rubin, would argue World-Wide Volkswagen's cause
before the Supreme Court instead of Mike Barkley.64 Had the "up-
stream" defendants not paid World-Wide Volkswagen's legal ex-
penses, there would have been no World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson decision by the United States Supreme Court.
The work began on the petition for certiorari. The weakest link in
the Oklahoma Supreme Court's opinion was its conclusion that World-
Wide and Seaway Volkswagen derived substantial revenue from the
use of automobiles in Oklahoma, since it was likely that no
62. See Booker v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 785 P.2d 297, 298 (Okla. 1989)("[A] manufac-
turer may be found to have a duty to indemnify its dealer against claims for loss
caused by the manufacturer's defect."); Braden v. Hendricks, 695 P.2d 1343, 1349-
50 (Okla. 1985)(manufacturer had an obligation created by law to indemnify its
dealer on a claim arising from the sale of a defective product); United Gen. Ins.
Co. v. Crane Carrier Co., 695 P.2d 1334, 1339 (Okla. 1984)("As a general rule, an
indemnitee is entitled to recover as part of his damages, reasonable attorney's
fees."); Porter v. Norton-Stuart Pontiac-Cadillac of Enid, 405 P.2d 109, 110 (Okla.
1965)(owner of garage was entitled to indemnity against manufacturer); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B(2)(d)(1977); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 51 at 342 (5th ed. 1984).
63. Interview with Mike Barkley, supra note 35.
64. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980).
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automobiles they had ever sold, aside from the Robinsons' Audi, had
been used in Oklahoma. However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court is
the final authority on matters of Oklahoma law,6 5 such as the meaning
of the phrase "derives substantial revenue from goods used... in this
state" in section 1701.03(4). The only issue the United States Supreme
Court could address was whether Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction
over World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen violated their rights to due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.6 6
Although it had long been a fundamental topic in every law school
civil procedure course, at the time the petition for certiorari was being
prepared, the constitutionality of a state court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants had been addressed in only a
a relatively small number of Supreme Court cases. One hundred
years before, the Supreme Court had ruled in the landmark case of
Pennoyer v. NefJP7 that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause places limits on a state court's exercise of jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants.68 The Pennoyer scheme of personal jurisdiction
was based on the physical presence of defendants: in general, the
courts of a forum state could exercise jurisdiction over any persons
and property within its borders but could not exercise jurisdiction
over persons and property outside its borders.6 9 Serious problems ul-
timately developed in applying this jurisdictional scheme to nonresi-
dent motorists, who might cause an accident in a state and depart
before the victims could serve them with summons. Similar difficul-
ties were presented by modern corporations that conduct business na-
tionwide but lack a physical presence in many states. These problems
led the Supreme Court to scrap the Pennoyer scheme in 1945 and re-
place it with a fairness standard based on minimum contacts and
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"7 0 in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington.7 1
During the early 1950s, the Supreme Court applied the new Inter-
national Shoe standard flexibly in several cases, 7 2 each time upholding
the exercise of personal jurisdiction. But in 1958, it ruled that a Flor-
65. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975)("This Court ... repeatedly
has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law").
66. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945)("Our only power over state
judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal
rights.").
67. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
68. Id. at 733.
69. Id. at 722 ("[E]very State possessess exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory.... [No State can exercise direct juris-
diction and authority over persons or property without its territory.").
70. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
71. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
72. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benquet
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ida state court's exercise of jurisdiction was unconstitutional in Han-
son v. Dencka.73 After Hanson, the Supreme Court seemed to lose
interest in the area, and during the next two decades, it did not take
any cases involving personal jurisdiction. Then in 1977 and 1978, the
Supreme Court handed down Shaffer v. Heitner74 and Kulko v. Supe-
rior Court,75 two decisions in which it reversed assertions of personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants by state courts.
The brief accompanying World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen's pe-
tition for certiorari emphasized the Supreme Court's three most re-
cent cases in which it had ruled in favor of defendants contesting
personal jurisdiction76 In Hanson v. Denckla, the Supreme Court
first articulated the rule that for a defendant to be subject to a state
court's jurisdiction, there must "be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws."77 The Supreme Court again employed this "purposeful
availment" requirement to strike down state courts' assertion of juris-
diction over nonresident defendants in Shaffer v. Heitners and Kulko
v. Superior Court,79 and World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen urged
its application in their own case.8 0 They pointed out that the Robin-
sons were responsible for the Audi's entering Oklahoma, and argued
that they should not be subject to jurisdiction in Oklahoma because of
"a fortuitous event precipitated by the unilateral, voluntary act of the
Robinsons in driving through that state." 81 World-Wide and Seaway
Volkswagen further argued the mere fact it may have been foresee-
able that the Robinsons might drive to Oklahoma should not be
enough to permit its courts to exercise jurisdiction over the compa-
Consol. Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950).
73. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
74. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
75. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
76. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980)(No. 78-1078).
77. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
78. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Shaffer v. Heitner arose out of a stockholder's derivative suit
concerning corporate mismanagement that was filed in Delaware. The plaintiff
attempted to base jurisdiction over the corporation's officers and directors on
their ownership of stock in the corporation.
79. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). The plaintiff in the Kulko case sued her former husband, a
New York domiciliary, in California to increase the husband's child support pay-
ments. The husband's only contact with California was that he had paid for his
daughter's plane ticket to California when she expressed her wish to live with
her mother. The Supreme Court held that this did not satisfy the purposeful
availment requirement.
80. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5-6, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)(No. 78-1078).
81. Id. at 6.
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nies; otherwise, any local seller would become subject to suit in every
state where a purchaser might take a product.8 2 They contended that
to provide a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, foreseeability had to be
coupled with the "affiliating circumstances" that the seller purpose-
fully availed itself of the benefits of the forum state.8 3
Mr. Greer responded that World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen
were parts of a national network of Audi dealers, including one lo-
cated in Tulsa on Route 66.84 Consequently, both World-Wide and
Seaway Volkswagen could reasonably anticipate that purchasers of
their automobiles would travel to Oklahoma and require servicing
there. He also cited a number of cases upholding jurisdiction where
torts committed in another state resulted in injuries in the forum
state.8 5 The Robinsons' brief in opposition to the petition for certio-
rari concluded with an appeal to the Supreme Court that it not return
to the restrictive jurisdictional doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, which the
Supreme Court had rejected twenty years before.8 6
The Supreme Court grants fewer than five percent of the
thousands of petitions for certiorari that are filed with it each year.8 7
The chances of having one's case heard by the High Court are there-
fore ordinarily slim, but the likelihood that the Court would grant
World-Wide Volkswagen's petition seemed especially remote. Not
only had the Supreme Court heard few cases involving personal juris-
diction over the preceding two decades, but it had denied numerous
petitions for certiorari presenting issues similar to those raised by
World-Wide Volkswagen.88
82. Cf. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905)(jurisdiction based on presence of intangible
property), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 n.39 (1977).
83. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980)(No. 78-1078).
84. Brief of Respondent at 11, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)(No. 78-1078).
85. Id. at 9-16.
86. Id. at 23.
87. For example, out of 4,781 on its docket during the October 1979 term, the
Supreme Court granted review in only 154 (3.22%) of them. ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
table A-I at 353 (1980).
88. E.g., Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir.)(exercise of jurisdiction in
products liability action over Italian supplier violated minimum contacts stan-
dard), cert denied, Fehr Bros., Inc. v. Acciaierie Weissenfels, 439 U.S. 983 (1978);
Ajax Realty Corp. v. J. F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1972)(Washington
manufacturer was subject to jurisdiction in Virginia in breach of warranty ac-
tion), cert denied, Durell Prod., Inc. v. Ajax Realty Corp., 411 U.S. 966 (1973);
Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.)(South Carolina lacked
jurisdiction over drug manufacturing companies from Connecticut and New
York), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1971); Stephenson v. Duriron Co., 401 P.2d 423
(Alaska)(New York manufacturer was subject to jurisdiction in Alaska), cert. de-
nied, Durion Co. v. Stephenson, 382 U.S. 956 (1965); Longines-Wittnauer Watch
Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 209 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y.)(upholding jurisdiction over
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One aspect of World-Wide Volkswagen's case, however, distin-
guished it from the others: it was the first petition for certiorari in a
products liability case where the allegedly defective product had been
brought into the forum state by a consumer, rather than by the manu-
facturer or a distributor.8 9 This would prove to be crucial to the
Supreme Court's decision that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction over
World-Wide Volkswagen and Seaway.90 Another factor that may have
influenced the Supreme Court was the coincidental filing of an appeal
in Rush v. Savchuk,91 a case from Minnesota involving an issue of
quasi in rem jurisdiction.92 The Supreme Court noted probable juris-
diction in Rush v. Savchuk on the same day that it granted World-
Wide and Seaway Volkswagen's petition for certiorari, and ordered
the two cases set for argument together.
It is interesting that in presenting their arguments to the Supreme
Court, both parties avoided mentioning that World-Wide and Seaway
Volkswagen were merely "straw defendants" joined by the Robinsons'
attorney to prevent removal from Creek County state court to the fed-
eral court in Tulsa. Instead, World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen at-
tempted to bolster their argument that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction
over them, urging the unfairness of being required to defend them-
selves in far-off Oklahoma if they were not dismissed from the case.9 3
In actuality, had they not been dismissed from the case, World-Wide
and Seaway Volkswagen unquestionably would have been defended
by Volkswagen of America and Audi NSU, whose lawyers were al-
ready representing them before the Supreme Court.
On the other side, Mr. Greer sought to convince the Supreme
Court of the reasonableness of the Oklahoma court's assertion of juris-
diction by stressing that if World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen were
not subject to suit in Oklahoma, the case against them would have to
be tried in New York.94 He fully realized, though, that there was no
Illinois manufacturer that had shipped product to New York), cert denied, Estw-
ing Mfg. Co. v. Singer, 382 U.S. 905 (1965); Deutsch v. West Coast Mach. Co., 497
P.2d 1311 (Wash.)(Washington court's assertion of jurisdiction over Japanese
manufacturer did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice), cert. denied, Kansai Iron Works, Ltd. v. Marubeni-Iida, Inc., 409 U.S. 1009
(1972).
89. Cf. cases cited supra note 88.
90. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
91. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
92. The appeal in the Rush v. Savchuk case was filed on December 13, 1978, and the
petition for certiorari in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson was filed on
January 5, 1979. 47 U.S.L.W. 3436 (U.S. Jan. 2, 1979); id. at 3484 (U.S. Jan. 16,
1979).
93. Brief for Petitioners at 7, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980)(No. 78-1078)("To require Seaway and World-Wide to defend in Oklahoma
in the absence of any activities by them is necessarily unfair and unreasonable.").
94. Brief of Respondent at 21, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
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reason for the Robinsons to sue World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen
in New York, when Volkswagen of America and Audi NSU were still
subject to suit in Oklahoma. 95
The apparent lack of a tactical justification for the heated contest
over jurisdiction perplexed Justice Blackmun. He began his dissent-
ing opinion in the case with the following remarks:
I confess that I am somewhat puzzled why the plaintiffs in this litigation
are so insistent that the regional distributor and the retail dealer, the petition-
ers here, who handled the ill-fated Audi automobile involved in this litigation,
be named defendants. It would appear that the manufacturer and the im-
porter, whose subjectability to Oklahoma jurisdiction is not challenged before
this Court, ought not to be judgment-proof. It may, of course, ultimately
amount to a contest between insurance companies that, once begun, is not eas-
ily brought to a termination. Having made this much of an observation, I pur-
sue it no further.
9 6
Neither Justice Blackmun nor the other Justices could have been
expected to know of Creek County's pro-plaintiff juries, and because it
never came up at oral argument, the Supreme Court did not fully un-
derstand the tactical posture of either party. The case is thus a good
example of a situation where both sides may have incentives to leave
certain information concealed from the court, so that the adversary
system fails to perform its purpose of promoting full disclosure. 97 The
"cases and controversies" requirement in Article III of the United
States Constitution is not always effective in bringing all the impor-
tant aspects of a lawsuit to the attention of the decision maker.
One can only guess whether the World-Wide Volkswagen case
would have been resolved differently if the Justices had been told that
the battle over jurisdiction was a fight over removal jurisdiction,
286 (1980)(No. 78-1078)("If the distributor and dealer defendants are removed
from the case, the litigation will be completed and have to be duplicated in New
York.").
95. At no time did Volkswagen of America and Audi NSU contest the Oklahoma
court's jurisdiction over them. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 288 n.3 (1980)("Both Volkswagen and Audi remain as defendants in the
litigation pending before the District Court in Oklahoma.").
96. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 317 (1980)(Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
97. Cf. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 17 (1980)("[Many of us trained in the
learned profession of the law spend much of our time subverting the law by
blocking the way to the truth. The subversion ... follows from the assigned roles
of counsel in the very system of law which thus finds its purposes thwarted.");
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 123 (1978)("Tlhe
adversary system in practice is known by its practioners often to be anything but
the truth-revealing process that it pretends to be."); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READ-
INGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 27
(1988)("Critics of the adversary system argue that parties should not be allowed
to control the information-gathering process because they cannot be trusted to
present all the relevant evidence. Rather, the parties are likely to provide only
the information that they think helps their cause.").
1140 [Vol. 72:1122
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
rather than personal jurisdiction, and that World-Wide and Seaway
Volkswagen were fully indemnified by Volkswagen of America and
Audi NSU. At the very least, certiorari might not have been granted,
but even if it had, the Court might have used different reasoning. Sev-
eral years after the World-Wide Volkswagen decision, the Supreme
Court decided Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,98 a case involving a
state court's exercise of jurisdiction over absent class action plaintiffs.
It upheld the assertion of jurisdiction over absent class action plain-
tiffs even though they did not have the minimum contacts with the
state that would be required for personal jurisdiction over an absent
defendant because "the Due Process Clause need not and does not af-
ford the former as much protection from state-court jurisdiction as it
does the latter."99 Part of the Supreme Court's rationale for affording
class action plaintiffs less "protection" than defendants was that the
class representatives are obligated to protect the interests of the ab-
sent class members.10 0 Had the Supreme Court been aware of the lim-
ited roles and exposure of World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen in the
litigation before it, the Court might have afforded them less protection
from Oklahoma's assertion of jurisdiction.
On January 21, 1980, just over a year after the filing of the petition
for certiorari, the Supreme Court issued its now famous decision re-
versing the Oklahoma Supreme Court.101 Justice White authored the
majority opinion in which the Court adopted the position urged by
World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen that the foreseeability of a prod-
uct's coming into a state and causing injury was not a sufficient basis
for personal jurisdiction. Rather, "the defendant's conduct and con-
nection with the forum State [must be] such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there."102 Applying the "purposeful
availment" standard from Hanson v. Denckla, the Court decided that
World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen were not subject to jurisdiction
in Oklahoma, because they did not serve the Oklahoma market either
directly or indirectly. 03 That it may have been foreseeable for the
Robinsons to drive their Audi to Oklahoma did not subject World-
Wide and Seaway Volkswagen to jurisdiction, because the actions of
the Robinsons did not constitute contacts by World-Wide and Seaway
Volkswagen with Oklahoma.104
A peculiar feature of Justice White's opinion is that it based the
"purposeful availment" standard on principles of interstate federalism
98. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
99. Id. at 811.
100. Id. at 809.
101. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
102. 1d at 297.
103. Id at 295.
104. Id- at 298.
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and the sovereignty of the individual states, as well as on the defend-
ants' individual liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.1 05 The opinion's reliance on federalism was soundly criticized
by Martin Redish, who objected that the principles of interstate feder-
alism are unrelated either to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause or to the limitations on personal jurisdiction that have
grown out of it.106
In Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Baux-
ites de Guinee,O7 the next personal jurisdiction case to come before it,
the Supreme Court executed a quick about-face. Again writing for the
majority, Justice White first acknowledged that the World-Wide
Volkswagen decision had stated that the limitations on personal juris-
diction reflect elements of federalism and state sovereignty.10s But he
went on to say that the limitations on personal jurisdiction were actu-
ally derived from the individual liberty interests protected by the Due
Process Clause, which are unrelated to federalism concerns. 10 9 Jus-
tice White added that federalism could not be the source of restric-
tions on the power of state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction; if it
were, defendants would be unable to waive jurisdiction.110
Had the Supreme Court known of Mr. Greer's reasons for naming
World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen as defendants, it might well
have based its decision on federalism concerns, but of a different type.
Instead of emphasizing the "purposeful availment" requirement, the
Court might have discussed the policies behind removal jurisdiction
and whether the joinder of nondiverse defendants who have little at
stake in the litigation and little connection with the forum state
should prevent removal to federal court.1 11
World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen's battle over jurisdiction
105. Id. at 294.
106. Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theo-
retical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1120-21 (1981). But see Allen R.
Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme Court's New Jurisdictional
Theory, 15 GA. L. REV. 19, 38-39 (1980)(finding support for use of Due Process
Clause as an expression of state sovereignty in Pennoyer v. Neff).
107. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
108. Id. at 702-03 n.10.
109. Id.
110. Id. The Insurance Corp. of Ireland case and its rejection of federalism as a basis
for limiting state court assertions of personal jurisdiction are thoroughly ex-
amined in Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignity" and the
Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NORE
DAME L. REV. 699, 781 (1983).
111. Cf. Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921)("[The] right of
removal cannot be defeated by a fraudulent joinder of a resident defendant hav-
ing no real connection with the controversy."); Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906
(S.D. Ohio 1989)(Pete Rose's joinder of nominal parties Cincinnati Reds and Ma-
jor League Baseball in suit against the Commissioner of Baseball did not require
remand to state court).
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ended with the Supreme Court's decision, which has become a staple
of civil procedure courses and casebooks since 1980. But the battle
over jurisdiction was only a preliminary skirmish in the many years of
litigation that lay ahead for the parties who remained in the case.
IV. THE TRIAL IN FEDERAL COURT AND SUBSEQUENT
LITIGATION
Bert Jones filed the second petition for removal on behalf of Volk-
swagen of America and Audi NSU in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma twenty nine days after the
Supreme Court's decision.112 In the petition he summarized the his-
tory of the litigation, and explained that the action had not been sub-
ject to removal until the Supreme Court ruled that the Oklahoma
courts had no jurisdiction over World-Wide and Seaway Volk-
swagen. 1 3 The petition concluded with a statement that this created
"a factual situation as though World-Wide and Seaway were found to
have been fraudulently joined parties to defeat jurisdiction."114 The
Robinsons did not challenge the second petition for removal with a
motion to remand.
It is interesting to note that this second petition for removal would
have been untimely if the current version of Section 1446 of Title 28
had been in effect at the time. An amendment to Section 1446 in 1988
added a one year time limit from the commencement of a case for
seeking removal when federal subject matter jurisdiction is based on
diversity of citizenship."15 Had this amendment been in effect, the de-
fendants would not have sought Supreme Court review of Judge
Woodson's decision to overrule the special appearances of World-Wide
and Seaway Volkswagen, because it would not have been feasible to
obtain review by the Supreme Court within one year after the com-
mencement of the Robinsons' case. The Robinsons would have had
their case tried in Creek County, and there would have been no
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson decision.
By the time the Robinsons' case was removed to federal court,
Judge Barrow had died, and the case was assigned to Judge James 0.
Ellison. Known by the local bar as a caring, kind-hearted individual,
with a deep devotion to fairness and a true concern for the weak and
disadvantaged, Judge Ellison had been appointed to the federal bench
the year before by President Carter."16 His involvement with the
Robinsons' case was to span more than a decade.
112. Petition for Removal, Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, No.
80-C-85-C (N.D. Okla. filed Feb. 19, 1980).
113. Id- at 1-2.
114. Id at 2-3.
115. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b)(West Supp. 1993)(historical and statutory notes).
116. Who's Who in American Law 280 (7th ed. 1992-1993).
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The Robinsons' case against Volkswagen of America and Audi
NSU was founded on allegations of design defects in the Audi's body
and fuel system. The 1976 Audi had what is known as a drop-in gas
tank. The gas tank was located in the bottom of its trunk, level with
the trunk floor, with only a layer of carpet separating the gas tank
from the trunk's interior. A filler pipe from the gas tank to the gas
cap ran next to the jack inside the trunk. Mr. Greer contended that
locating the gas tank in the trunk made it susceptible to puncture in a
rear-end collision, particularly if metal objects were stored in the
trunk. Moreover, placing the gasoline filler pipe next to the jack was
dangerous, because it was foreseeable that the filler pipe could be sev-
ered by the jack in a rear-end collision. He maintained that the Audi's
manufacturer should have mounted the gas tank over the rear axle
and between the wheels, where it would be better protected in
collisions.117
Mr. Greer also contended that the Audi should have been designed
to prevent a fire in the trunk from spreading to the passenger com-
partment. The Audi had a steel wall separating the trunk from the
rear of the passenger compartment, but it had a number of large holes
in it that might permit gasoline to spread to the passenger compart-
ment through the area over the rear seat. Finally, he claimed that the
Audi's uni-body construction was responsible for all its doors being
wedged shut in the collision so that the Robinsons could not escape
from the burning car. Noting that the Robinsons' only injuries were
burns and that they suffered no injuries from the collision itself, he
argued that the collision was not very severe, and that the Audi should
have been designed to withstand a collision without its doors trapping
the occupants inside.118
Mr. Jones put up a vigorous defense. His strategy was to blame the
accident on Lloyd Hull, the drunken driver of the Ford Torino that
rear-ended the Audi. At his deposition taken five months after the
accident, Mr. Hull testified that he had not looked at his speedometer
until after he had come to a stop and therefore, he did not know how
fast he was going.1 19 Because the speedometer was jammed at 75 mph,
Mr. Hull estimated his speed to be in the neighborhood of 90 mph, but
he admitted that he might have been going as slow as 75 mph or as fast
as 110 mph.120 Mr. Jones argued that it was unreasonable to expect
the Audi to be designed so that its gas tank would withstand such a
117. Opening Statements, Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, No.
80-C-85-E, transcript at 5-8 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 23, 1981).
118. Id-
119. Deposition of Lloyd Hull, supra note 1, at 16-18.
120. Id. at 35-36.
1144 [Vol. 72:1122
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
severe impact.121 He also pointed out that post-crash fires arising
from rear-end collisions are exceedingly rare. Of the more than three
and a half million Audis with the same fuel system, the Robinsons'
accident was the first the company was aware of in which an Audi had
caught fire in a collision. 22 Furthermore, in 1975, when the 1976 Audi
was designed, it was common for manufacturers to use drop-in gas
tanks located in the trunk, and the Audi gas tank was made with
thicker steel than that used by most other manufacturers.123 Mr.
Jones also claimed that the steel wall separating the passenger com-
partment from the trunk did prevent the fire from spreading to the
passenger compartment. His medical expert had testified that the
Robinsons' burns would have been much worse if they had been sub-
jected to direct flames inside the passenger compartment. Mr. Jones
contended that the source of the Robinsons' burns was actually heat
radiating from the fire in the car's trunk. 24
In addition to arguing that the Audi gas tank was not defectively
designed, Mr. Jones disputed the Robinsons' contention that they
were trapped in the Audi because its doors had jammed. After she
was taken to the hospital, Kay Robinson had asked Mike Miller to
retrieve her purse from the car. When he went to the salvage yard to
look for the purse, Mr. Miller noticed that while the doors on the
driver's side were jammed shut, both doors on the passenger's side
could be opened. 2 5 Mr. Jones contended that the doors on the passen-
ger's side had been locked at the time of the accident, and the reason
the Robinsons did not leave the burning car on their own was that
they had panicked and failed to unlock them.2
6
The trial lasted four weeks.127 Much of the evidence related to
technical issues of automotive design, and it was presented through a
number of engineering experts for both sides. Mr. Greer also offered
considerable evidence on damages. This included descriptions of the
Robinsons' physical injuries, their numerous surgical procedures, the
many months of physical therapy, the excruciating pain from their
burns, and the psychological trauma caused by the pain and disfigure-
ment.2s Leonard Pataki, Judge Ellison's law clerk, remembers that
the case was very well-tried by both sides. He was especially im-
121. Opening Statements, Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, No.
80-C-85-E, transcript at 42 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 23, 1981).
122. Id. at 28-29.
123. I. at 27-28.
124. Id. at 27-34.
125. Id. at 36.
126. Id. at 35-37.
127. Opening statements in the case were on November 23, 1981, and closing argu-
ments were on December 17, 1981.
128. Closing Arguments, Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, No.
80-C-85-E, transcript at 15-17 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 17, 1981).
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pressed by the quality of the demonstrative evidence used.129 Mr.
Greer had had an Audi of the same design as the Robinsons' cut in half
to show the location of the gas tank and fuel system, and had it moved
to the basement of the federal courthouse for viewing by the jury.130
Mr. Jones had film footage of Audi rear-end crash tests, which he
showed to the jury, and seventeen different gas tanks were displayed
to the jury during the course of the trial.13' At one point during the
trial, he requested permission to present a demonstration that in-
volved lighting a fire inside the courtroom, but Judge Ellison refused
to allow it.132
The theme of Mr. Greer's closing argument was that while Lloyd
Hull caused the accident and the damage to the Audi, the harm to the
people was caused by the car's manufacturer.133 He concluded his ar-
gument with a chilling suggestion to the jurors that if they ever drove
a lightweight car, they should be sure to drive with the windows down
so they would have a better chance of escaping after an accident.134
After six hours of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for the
defense. Leonard Pataki was mildly surprised that the jurors ap-
peared not to have let their natural sympathy for the Robinsons inter-
fere with their responsibility to follow the law as laid out in Judge
Ellison's instructions.135
The Robinsons appealed to the Tenth Circuit, urging a number of
grounds for reversal, ranging from discovery abuse to improper evi-
dentiary rulings and jury instructions. 3 6 The appellate court ruled
that most of the Robinsons' claims of error did not warrant reversal,
but decided that a new trial was necessary because one of Judge Elli-
son's rulings excluding several documents that Mr. Greer believed
were critical to the Robinsons' case.13 7 These documents had been ob-
tained by Robert Brenner, one of the Robinsons' engineering experts,
from the files of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA).138
In the course of promulgating rules governing safety standards, the
NHTSA is required to notify motor vehicle manufacturers in advance
of its proposed rules and request their comments. 139 In 1968, Volk-
129. Interview with Leonard Pataki (Aug. 14, 1992).
130. Id
131. Interview with Bert M. Jones, supra note 14.
132. I&
133. Closing Arguments, Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, No.
80-C-85-E, transcript at 6 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 17, 1981).
134. Id- at 20.
135. Interview with Leonard Pataki, supra note 129.
136. Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union, 739 F.2d 1481, 1483-87 (10th Cir. 1984).
137. Id- at 1489.
138. Jefferson G. Greer, supra note 29.
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1392(b)(1988)(Administrative Procedures Act applies to orders es-
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swagen of America had submitted the following response to a pro-
posed rule requiring the use of puncture-resistant fuel tanks:
"Puncture resistance of the fuel tank is only important if the tank is
located inside the trunk of the vehicle. Pieces of luggage or tools with
sharp edges can locally penetrate the tank."' 40 Mr. Greer asserted
that this response proved the Robinsons' case of strict liability, be-
cause it showed that the manufacturer was aware of the danger of
placing a drop-in gas tank in the trunk of the Audi.141
Judge Ellison initially ruled that the NHTSA documents were ad-
missible against both Volkswagen of America and Audi NSU, but after
hearing argument from Myron Shapiro, an associate with Herzfeld
and Rubin, he reversed his initial ruling and excluded them.142 Mr.
Shapiro had pointed out that the documents showed on their face that
they had been submitted by Volkswagen of America on behalf of
Volkswagen of Germany, and not on behalf of Audi NSU, the manu-
facturer of the Audi. He argued that they were irrelevant to products
liability claims involving Audis.143 Mr. Greer contended that the doc-
uments were admissible as admissions of an agent under Federal Rule
of Evidence 801(d)(2), because Volkswagen of America was a wholly
owned subsidiary of Volkswagen of Germany, and Volkswagen of Ger-
many held a majority interest in Audi NSU.144 Judge Ellison decided
not to admit the documents against Audi NSU on the grounds that any
knowledge that Volkswagen of America may have had concerning the
dangers of drop-in gas tanks could not be imputed to its principal,
Audi NSU.145 Judge Ellison also concluded that the documents were
not admissible against Volkswagen of America because Volkswagen of
America was not responsible for the Audi's design, and therefore its
knowledge of any design defects was not relevant to the Robinsons'
claim against it.146
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed as to Audi NSU, but re-
versed as to Volkswagen of America.147 It determined that the
NHTSA documents could not be attributed to Audi NSU, because they
were submitted by Volkswagen of America on behalf of Volkswagen
of Germany before the agency relationship between Volkswagen of
tablishing or amending safety standards); 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988)(requiring publica-
tion of notice of proposed rule making in the Federal Register).
140. Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, 739 F.2d 1481, 1488 (10th
Cir. 1984).
141. I& at 1486, 1488.
142. Conference, Robinson v. Audi NSU Aktiengesellschaft, No. 80-C-85-E, transcript
at 8, 37 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 24, 1981).
143. Id. at 16-24.
144. Id. at 30-31.
145. Id at 8, 37.
146. Id. at 37.




America and Audi NSU arose. Thus, the documents did not qualify as
admissions of an agent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(C)
and were inadmissible hearsay as to Audi NSU.148 In contrast, the
documents were clearly attributable to Volkswagen of America, since
it was the entity that submitted them to the NHTSA.149 The Tenth
Circuit rejected Judge Ellison's determination that the documents
were not relevant to the Robinsons' claim against Volkswagen of
America, which was not responsible for the Audi's design. The Tenth
Circuit ruled that a distributor stands in the same shoes as the manu-
facturer under Oklahoma products liability law, and accordingly any
evidence concerning an alleged defect in a product that would be ad-
missible against a manufacturer would be admissible against a distrib-
utor.150 Finding the NHTSA documents to be the "most compelling
evidence of prior knowledge,"151 the Tenth Circuit held that Judge
Ellison's decision to exclude them was not only erroneous, but also
prejudicial to the Robinsons.15 2 It ordered a new trial against Volk-
swagen of America alone so a second jury would have the opportunity
to consider Volkswagen of America's prior knowledge of the dangers
of the Audi drop-in gas tank design.153
After the Tenth Circuit issued its decision in July, 1984, Mr. Greer
began preparation for a second trial against Volkswagen of America
before Judge Ellison. Despite his defeat in the first trial, he was opti-
mistic about prevailing against Volkswagen of America. A major rea-
son was that he would at last be allowed to use the "smoking gun"
NHTSA documents against Volkswagen of America to prove its
knowledge of the risks of the drop-in gas tank design.-54
Another significant advantage that Mr. Greer believed he would
have at the second trial was the chance to introduce evidence of a sub-
sequent design change in the Audi's fuel system to support the Robin-
sons' claim that the previous design was defective. Beginning with the
1980 model, Audi had moved the gas tank out of the trunk to the front
of the rear axle, where it was better protected from rear-end colli-
sions.1 55 At the time of the first trial in 1981, it appeared that evidence
of this design change was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 407, because it was a subsequent remedial measure.1 56 How-
ever, in September 1983, the Tenth Circuit held in Herndon v. Seven
148. I& at 1487.
149. I&
150. Id- at 1488.
151. I& at 1489.
152. I&
153. Id
154. See supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text.
155. Jefferson G. Greer, supra note 29.
156. FED. R. EVID. 407 provides in pertinent part: "When, after an event, measures are
taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur,
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Bar Flying Service, Inc.,15 7 that rule 407 is not applicable in products
liability cases.15 8 As a result of the Herndon case, Mr. Greer expected
to be allowed to prove, when the case was retried, that Audi no longer
used drop-in gas tanks in its vehicles.
Mr. Greer's optimism was short-lived. Before he could get the
Robinson case to trial the second time, the Robinsons' claim against
Volkswagen of America was extinguished by a decision of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court. Braden v. Hendricksls9 was a products lia-
bility suit against Ford Motor Company and an auto dealer from
whom the plaintiff had purchased her station wagon. After the trial
judge granted the dealer's demurrer to the evidence (the Oklahoma
analog to a motion for judgment as a matter of law), the jury returned
a verdict in favor of Ford.160 When the plaintiff appealed, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Ford on the jury
verdict.161 In addition, it affirmed the judgment in favor of the dealer,
despite its finding that the trial judge "clearly erred" in granting the
dealer's demurrer to the evidence.162 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
ruled that the claim against the dealer should originally have been
allowed to go to the jury, because the dealer's liability was coextensive
with the manufacturer's. 63 Nevertheless, it held that a retrial of the
claim against the dealer was precluded by the judgment for the manu-
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or cul-
pable conduct in connection with the event."
157. 716 F.2d 1322, 1327 (10th Cir. 1983) ("Rule 407's exclusion of evidence, however, is
inappropriate in actions against defendants who are pursuing activities for which
society has decided to assess strict liability."), cer denied, Piper Aircraft Corp. v.
Seven Bar Flying Serv., 466 U.S. 958 (1984).
158. In Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1984),
the Tenth Circuit held that evidence of subsequent remedial measures would not
be admissible in a diversity case if this evidence was not admissible under the
applicable state law. The court explained its rather complicated position on the
admissibility of subsequent remedial measures as follows:
If a state has not announced controlling rules, such as New Mexico,
(Herndon, supra), the federal district court, sitting as a state court in a
product liability diversity case, must determine whether Rule 407 ap-
plies. Where the state law is expressed in product liability cases, these
expressions control the application of Rule 407.
Id. at 932. Neither the Oklahoma Legislature nor its courts had resolved the
question of the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in
products liability cases. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2407 (1991) (substantially identi-
cal language to FED. R. EviD. 407). As a consequence, the rule from Herndon,
rather than the limitation in the Moe decison, would have controlled at the retrial
of the Robinsons' case, and the evidence of the design change would have been
adimissible.
159. 695 P.2d 1343 (Okla. 1985).
160. Id- at 1347.
161. Id at 1352.
162. Id. at 1351-52.
163. Id. at 1351.
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facturer. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reasoned that the dealer's
liability was vicarious, because the alleged product defect was solely
attributable to the manufacturing process rather than to the dealer's
conduct. It held: "Because Ford's alleged breach clearly was a sine
qua non of the dealer's own liability for marketing an unsafe car,
Ford's exoneration also served to absolve the dealer."164
Mr. Jones promptly filed a motion for summary judgment on be-
half of Volkswagen of America, relying on the Braden decision. Judge
Ellison granted the motion, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sum-
mary judgment.165 Mr. Greer advised Harry and Kay Robinson
against petitioning either the Tenth Circuit for a rehearing or the
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, because he be-
lieved that there was little chance of success.166 Thus, after nine years
of litigation, it appeared that the Robinsons' pursuit of a recovery for
their horrible injuries had finally come to an end.
But just as Mike Miller had appeared at the scene of the accident to
rescue the Robinsons from the burning Audi, another figure entered
the picture at this point to attempt to revive their case. Winton
Woods, a law professor teaching civil procedure at the University of
Arizona, had met the Robinsons after they reached Tucson. In 1978,
he had written a law review article inaccurately predicting that the
Supreme Court would uphold jurisdiction over World-Wide and Sea-
way Volkswagen, 167 and he had maintained an interest in the case af-
ter its removal to federal court. Shortly after the Robinsons received
word of the Tenth Circuit's decision affirming summary judgment
against them, they came to Professor Woods for help. Professor
Woods happened to have owned a Volkswagen dealership during the
1950s, and he had some familiarity with the Volkswagen and Audi or-
164. Id. at 1352 (emphasis in original). The effect of allowing suit against the dealer
after the plaintiff lost the suit against Ford would be to allow the plaintiff a re-
covery when a jury had already decided there was no defect. Moreover, if the
plaintiff were successful in a subsequent suit against the dealer, the dealer could
obtain indemnity from Ford, so that Ford would have to pay indirectly for a de-
sign defect after it had been directly exonereated in the first suit. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 cmt. b; cmt. c, illus. 4 (1982)(judgment against in-
jured person in suit against defendant who is primarily responsible bars second
action against defendant who is vicariously responsible for conduct of the other
defendant).
165. Robinson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 803 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1986).
166. Letter from Jefferson G. Greer, Attorney, to Mr. & Mrs. Harry Robinson (Oct. 17,
1986)(on file with the University of Nebraska College of Law Library).
167. Winton D. Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and
Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 20 ARiZ. L. REv. 861, 908 (1978). Other publications by Professor
Woods relating to personal jurisdiction include Winton D. Woods, Carnival
Cruise Lines v. Shute: An Amicus Inquiry Into the Future of "Purposeful Avail-
ment," 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1393 (1990); Winton D. Woods, Burnham v. Superior
Court: New Wine, Old Bottles, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 199 (1990).
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ganizations. After reviewing the files in the case, he decided that the
Tenth Circuit had made a fundamental mistake in the first appeal, and
that it had been misled by the law firm of Herzfeld and Rubin as to
the true relationship between Audi NSU and Volkswagen of
Germany.168
The Robinsons retained Professor Woods to represent them, and
he filed a motion for rehearing with the Tenth Circuit on their behalf,
urging it to vacate the judgments below and remand for further pro-
ceedings. He argued that the NHTSA documents should have been
introduced at the first trial against both Audi NSU and Volkswagen of
America, since Audi NSU was essentially the same company as Volk-
swagen of Germany, the parent company of Volkswagen of
America.169 Attached to the motion for rehearing was Professor
Woods' own affidavit asserting that the manufacturer of Audi
automobiles had been a wholly owned subsidiary of Volkswagen of
Germany when the Robinsons' Audi was designed and also when
Volkswagen of America submitted to the NHTSA the document per-
taining to the puncture resistance of gas tanks.1 70
Following denial of the petition for rehearing, the Robinsons, rep-
resented by Professor Woods, filed a new action in the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona, Tucson Division, against
Volkswagen of Germany, Herzfeld and Rubin, and Greer and Greer.
In addition to alleging claims for negligence, products liability, and
breach of warranty against Volkswagen of Germany, the complaint al-
leged that Volkswagen of Germany and Herzfeld and Rubin had
fraudulently concealed the true relationship between Volkswagen of
Germany and Audi NSU in order to cause the trial court erroneously
to exclude the NHTSA documents at the first trial. The claim against
Greer and Greer was for legal malpractice. Greer and Greer also filed
a cross-claim against the other defendants, seeking recovery of their
contingency fee.17 '
Herzfeld and Rubin moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, and the federal court in Arizona ruled that Herzfeld and Rubin
lacked minimum contacts with Arizona. Instead of dismissing the
claim against Herzfeld and Rubin, however, the federal court ordered
168. Letter from Winton D. Woods, Professor of Law, The University of Arizona, to
Jefferson G. Greer, Attorney (Oct. 16, 1986)(on file with the University of Ne-
braska College of Law Library).
169. Motion for Rehearing, Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union, No. 85-1831 (10th Cir.
filed Nov. 10, 1986).
170. Id
171. Jefferson G. Greer, supra note 29. In addition to the many thousands of hours
that Jefferson and Frank Greer had invested in the case, they had also advanced
$50,000 in costs and provided the Robinsons with housing during the four-week
trial in 1981. I&
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the entire case transferred7 2 to the Northern District of Oklahoma on
grounds of comity, so that Judge Ellison would have the opportunity
to rule on the claims of fraud on the court.
After the case was returned to Judge Ellison, Volkswagen of Ger-
many and Herzfeld and Rubin both filed motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment on the fraud claim, with Herzfeld and Rubin
claiming absolute immunity with respect to the defense of its clients in
the prior litigation. 173 Judge Ellison denied the motions, and Herzfeld
and Rubin filed an interlocutory appeal. The Tenth Circuit, after rul-
ing that the denial of the claim of absolute immunity was a collateral
order which was immediately appealable, affirmed Judge Ellison's de-
cision.1 74 The Court of Appeals held that while prosecutors and gov-
ernment lawyers had been granted absolute immunity on claims
similar to those alleged against Herzfeld and Rubin, absolute immu-
nity had not been extended to private lawyers except on defamation
claims.175
The Robinsons also filed a separate action to vacate the judgment
in the underlying case on the grounds of fraud upon the court.176
Judge Ellison conducted a bench trial'77 in this action during the sum-
mer of 1992. Although Judge Ellison acknowledged that he would
have admitted the NHTSA documents into evidence at the first trial if
he had known of the corporate relationships between Audi NSU and
Volkswagen of Germany, he found that there was no clear and con-
vincing evidence of fraud on the court.1 78 Accordingly, he dismissed
the action to vacate the judgment in the underlying case.179 The case
is still not at an end, though, because the Robinsons have appealed.1 80
V. WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN'S SIGNIFICANCE TODAY
Although the Supreme Court was concerned only with World-
Wide and Seaway Volkswagen, its decision had a substantial effect on
the Robinsons' case against Volkswagen of America and Audi NSU.
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988)(authorizing transfer to cure want of jurisdiction).
173. Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesllschaft, 940 F.2d 1369, 1370 (10th Cir.
1991).
174. Id. at 1370, 1374.
175. Id. at 1372-73.
176. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).
177. See Order, Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, No. 88-C-367 (N.D.
Okla. filed Jan. 28, 1991)(directing to case to be heard as a FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)
bench trial).
178. Order and Judgment, Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft, No. 88-C-367-E (N.D.
Okla., filed Sep. 17, 1992).
179. Order of Dismissal, Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft, No. 88-C-367-E (N.D.
Okla., filed Jan. 21, 1993).
180. Notice of Appeal, Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft, No. 88-C-367-E (N.D.
Okla., filed Nov. 30, 1992).
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The Supreme Court decision resulted in the Robinsons' case being
tried to a conservative jury in federal court in Tulsa, rather than to a
potentially more sympathetic jury in Creek County state court. It al-
most certainly influenced the outcome of the case and the lives of the
Robinsons. Beyond that, the World-Wide Volkswagen decision has
become a landmark in the development of the law of personal
jurisdiction.
The decision is significant because of what it has to say about the
relevance of state boundaries to the state court's assertion of personal
jurisdiction.18 ' With its emphasis on "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice," the International Shoe decision suggested (at
least to some commentators) 8 2 that personal jurisdiction should be
based entirely on geographic convenience. The World-Wide Volk-
swagen decision emphatically rejected this position:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being
forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State
has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum
State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause,
acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest
the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
183
World-Wide Volkswagen thus stands for the proposition that state
boundaries do matter.184 Geographical convenience is only a secon-
dary consideration.
The way that state boundaries now matter differs from the way
they did under the Pennoyer v. Neff scheme. Defendants no longer
need to be physically present within a state's boundaries in order to be
subject to the jurisdiction of its courts.185 Instead of physical presence,
181. Professor Brilmayer has identified the relevance of state borders as one of the
perennial themes in the law of personal jurisdiction. Lea Brilmayer, Introduc-
tion: Three Perennial Themes in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS
LJ. 561 (1991).
182. See, e.g., Daan Braveman, Interstate Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction, 33
SYRACUSE L. REv. 533, 534 (1982)("[T]he proper constitutional limitations on
state judicial authority should be derived from considerations of fairness and not
from imaginary concerns about interstate harmony."); Martin H. Redish, Due
Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw.
U.L. REv. 1112, 1137 (1981)("[T]he only concern of a principled due process juris-
dictional analysis should be the avoidance of inconvenience to the defendant.").
See also Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law
of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L. REV. 689, 689-90 (1987)(characterizing the
view that limitations of personal jurisdiction are derived solely from considera-
tions of geographic convenience and predictability of result as an "emerging con-
sensus" among commentators).
183. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
184. Allen R. Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme Court's New Jurisdic-
tional Theory, 15 GA. L. REv. 19, 38-39 (1980)("Under the Court's new analysis,
state lines can become barriers to jurisdiction in situations where jurisdiction
could be obtained under an analysis based solely on convenience.").
185. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
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the law requires minimum contacts between the defendant and the
forum state. 8 6 And in the World-Wide Volkswagen decision, the
Supreme Court summed up its standard for determining whether the
minimum contacts requirement is satisfied: "[Tihe defendant's con-
duct and connection with the forum State [must be] such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 8 7 This
standard is subject to the criticism that it may lead in a circle, because
a "defendant cannot know if his actions will subject him to jurisdiction
in another State until we have declared what the law of jurisdiction
is.,"88 Nevertheless, it can provide lawyers and judges with some de-
gree of predictability with respect to the law of personal jurisdic-
tion, 8 9 and World-Wide Volkswagen continues to provide the
governing standard for minimum contacts in personal jurisdiction
cases.
For example, in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,190 the Supreme
Court upheld jurisdiction over a publisher in a libel case because it
should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in a state
where it sold its magazines.'19 Similarly, the Supreme Court applied
the World-Wide Volkswagen standard in Calder v. JonesL92 to uphold
jurisdiction over a reporter and editor in another libel case because
they should reasonably have anticipated being haled into a court in a
state where they knew that their article would cause harm to the
plaintiff's reputation.193
The application of the World-Wide Volkswagen standard is also
illustrated by Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.194 In Burger King, the
Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction in a breach of contract case over a
franchisee who had entered into a long term franchise contract with
Burger King, a Florida corporation. The Supreme Court ruled that
the franchisee should reasonably have anticipated being haled into
court in Florida on account of the contract documents and the course
186. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
187. Id. at 297.
188. Id. at 311 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. Cf. Id. at 297 ("The Due Process Clause... gives a degree of predictability to the
legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct
with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render
them liable to suit.").
190. 465 U.S. 777 (1984).
191. Id. at 781 ("Where, as in this case, respondent Hustler Magazine, Inc., has contin-
uously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market, it must reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there in a libel action based on the contents of its
magazine.")(citing World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
192. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
193. Id. at 790 ("Under the circumstances, petitioners must 'reasonably anticipate be-
ing haled into court there' to answer for the truth of the statements made in their
article.")(citing World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
194. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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of dealing between the parties.195
Most recently, the Supreme Court relied on the World-Wide Volk-
swagen decision in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court.J96 The
Supreme Court was unanimous in concluding that a California court
had no jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer of a component of a
motorcycle tire that allegedly caused an injury in California, but the
Court was so divided as to its rationale that there was no majority
opinion.
Justice O'Connor, with three other Justices, concluded that the
foreign manufacturer had not subjected itself to jurisdiction in Cali-
fornia when it sold components to another foreign company, because
its sales activity was not directed toward California.197 Justice Bren-
nan, joined by three other Justices, disagreed. Relying on World-
Wide Volkswagen, Justice Brennan reasoned that the foreign manu-
facturer should reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in
California because it was well aware that the components it sold to the
other foreign company were being incorporated into a product that
was sold in California.198 Nevertheless, he agreed with Justice
O'Connor's conclusion that the exercise of jurisdiction was improper
because of geographical convenience and other fairness considera-
tions.199 Finally, Justice Stevens, joined by two other Justices, rea-
soned that since fairness considerations precluded the exercise of
jurisdiction, it was unnecessary to decide whether minimum contacts
existed.200 Although the Justices divided over its application, they
unanimously agreed that the World-Wide Volkswagen decision sup-
plied the controlling standard.201
With its emphasis on the significance of state boundaries, World-
Wide Volkswagen represents an important shift in the law of personal
jurisdiction, and it remains a watershed case.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Robinsons' case against Volkswagen of America and Audi
NSU is a remarkable story, interesting on many levels. Most obvi-
ously, it produced a landmark jurisdictional ruling. Less well known
is the tale of terror and suffering that Kay, Eva, and Sam Robinson
experienced as they were trapped in the burning car, and the courage
of Mike Miller, who risked his own life to save three people he had
never met. Additionally, the case generated some fascinating tactical
195. Id. at 472-82, 486-87.
196. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
197. Id at 112.
198. Id at 121.
199. Id. at 116.
200. I& at 121-22.
201. Id. at 105, 116, 121.
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maneuvering by various teams of lawyers over the choice of forum.
While the attorneys argued to the Oklahoma and United States
Supreme Courts concerning Oklahoma's jurisdiction over World-Wide
and Seaway Volkswagen, what they were really fighting over was
whether the case against Volkswagen of America and Audi NSU
would be tried in Creek County or the federal court in Tulsa.
The case was also characterized by a series of improbable coinci-
dences that began with the rear-end collision's causing not only the
rupture of the Audi's gas tank but the jamming of its doors and win-
dows as well, so that the Robinsons could not escape from the passen-
ger compartment on their own. They surely would have died had
Mike Miller not happened to have seen the accident from another
highway and decided to stop to help. The battle over personal jurisdic-
tion that led the adversaries to the United States Supreme Court came
about because of the happenstance that the accident occurred barely
inside of Creek County. If the accident had happened in another
county, the Robinsons' attorneys would not have bothered to join
World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen as defendants, and the other de-
fendants would not have been motivated to seek their dismissal. And
lastly, had it not been for the coincidental filing of the Rush v.
Savchuk appeal, World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen's petitions for
certiorari probably would not have been granted.
Another noteworthy feature of the Robinsons' case was the unu-
sual interplay between the Tenth Circuit decision ordering a new trial
with respect to Volkswagen of America and the Oklahoma Supreme
Court decision in a different case that prevented the new trial from
proceeding. And lastly, the ongoing litigation against Herzfeld and
Rubin and Volkswagen of Germany presents fundamental questions
concerning the finality of judgments and the role of the attorney in an
adversary system.
What is most noteworthy about the Robinsons' encounter with the
justice system, though, is the monumental injustice of its failure to
provide redress for their injuries. Unfortunately for the Robinsons,
Lloyd Hull, the person most responsible for their injuries, had no in-
surance and was judgment proof. Since they could not recover from
Mr. Hull, the Robinsons were forced to bring a difficult products lia-
bility suit that has continued for fifteen years, with its end still not in
sight. The Robinsons' frustrating experience with this litigation has
been a tragedy, exacerbated by its close connection to the tragedy they
suffered fifteen years ago. Surely, the system has failed both its own
purposes and the Robinson family.
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